

# The Christian

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Edited by  
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# News-Letter

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THE CURRENT NUMBER of *Christianity and Crisis*, which in many respects the American counterpart of the Christian News-Letter, contains some interesting comments on American reactions to what was said by the Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council of Churches about Christianity, capitalism and communism. The passage which has evoked very strong protests in the United States occurs in the Report presented to the Assembly by Commission III on "The Church and the Disorder of Society".

This Report was presented by the Commission to the whole Assembly and, after a few amendments had been made, was "received unanimously by the Assembly and commended to the Churches for their serious consideration and appropriate action".<sup>1</sup>

The passage which has come under fire in the United States reads as follows :—

"The Christian Churches should reject the ideologies of both communism and *laissez-faire* capitalism, and should seek to draw men away from the false assumption that these extremes are the only alternatives. Each has made promises which it could not redeem. Communist ideology

<sup>1</sup> The Report is printed in full at the end of the third Amsterdam volume *The Church and the Disorder of Society*, S.C.M. Press, 12s. 6d.

## NEWS-LETTER

SOME AMERICAN REACTIONS  
TO AMSTERDAM

THE TROUBLED CONSCIENCES  
OF SCIENTISTS

## SUPPLEMENT

THE CHRISTIAN AND HISTORY

I.—The Christian and  
Academic History

By

H. BUTTERFIELD

puts the emphasis upon economic justice, and promises that freedom will come automatically after the completion of the revolution. Capitalism puts the emphasis upon freedom, and promises that justice will follow as a by-product of free enterprise ; that, too, is an ideology which has been proved false. It is the responsibility of Christians to seek new, creative solutions which never allow either justice or freedom to destroy the other."

In Great Britain these words have not evoked comment outside religious circles. One reason is that non-religious bodies are less interested in the utterances of the Church about social and economic affairs in this country than they are in the United States, but the chief reason is that the idea of directing Christians to reject the ideologies of communism and *laissez-faire* capitalism and to seek new creative solutions does not strike anybody as either original or unreasonable. Our main political parties are committed to discovering a middle way, though as the 1950 election draws on it becomes clearer that even middle ways have two sides to them, and that the two sides may be very far apart.

But the representatives of the American Churches who attended the Amsterdam Assembly and voted for the passage quoted above have returned home to be greeted by a loud chorus of disapproval. The National City Bank in its December letter, for example, imputes to the World Council of Churches a preference for communism. The Empire Trust letter, an influential financial monthly, speaks of "the shock, the anger . . . shared by thousands of other thoughtful Americans, good Christians, at the Amsterdam 'Dictatus Papae' that assailed the very basis of Western faith". It accuses Amsterdam churchmen of "ignorance of history and misapprehension of capitalism. *Laissez-faire* never did mean the right of the powerful to ride roughshod over their fellow men", and it throws out the dark hint that "the files of the Dies Committee reveal the astonishing affiliations of many Church leaders with radical fronts and red transmission belts". The *Chicago Tribune* also accuses Churchmen of not understanding capitalism, which is simply the right to

own private property, so that "the corner peanut vendor if he owns his own machine is as much a capitalist as anyone else". The National City Bank in its criticism reflects, according to the Editor of *Christianity and Crisis*, a widespread tendency in America to forget, in post-war prosperity, the social crises of the country's own past and the social catastrophes which have racked Europe and helped to feed communism. Mass unemployment and occasional social catastrophes, the National City Bank says, are inevitable in highly developed societies, and there is "no reason to assume that capitalism is less able to cope with this problem than some other type of society".

From these quotations it is clear that American churchmen returning from Amsterdam have had to stand to their guns. Nor can they count, it seems, on wise and staunch support among fellow Christians. The *Christian Century*, for example, one of the largest religious journals in the United States, accuses the American representatives of having been dragged into conformity with the "leftist beliefs of the Churchmen of Europe". The vast majority of the members of American Protestant Churches, says this paper, believe in capitalism, and the American representatives at Amsterdam should have nailed this flag to their mast and taken their stand by it. It goes on to accuse the Report of transferring the Church's concern "from the spiritual business of converting men to the secular business of converting man's institutions". *Christianity and Crisis* acutely remarks that this would have been a very good argument for preserving slavery, the absolute monarchy and many other institutions which Christian men have taken a hand in abolishing.

The account of this American experience may perhaps stimulate the reflection that in this country that Report has not yet received the attention it deserves even from Christian people, and if on re-reading it we find not much to anger us it may be because the Americans at Amsterdam exhibited a willingness to listen to criticisms of themselves and their society, and indeed to proffer self-criticism, which makes the British attitude, in retrospect, seem a little complacent.



## THE TROUBLED CONSCIENCES OF SCIENTISTS

Few things have been more striking since the end of the war than the extent to which the minds of scientists, in America, Great Britain and France, and doubtless in other countries as well, have been exercised about the uses to which their discoveries may be put. Scientists have been more articulate than any other section of the community about the moral problems raised by the atomic bomb. During the past six months an active discussion about the responsibilities of scientists has been going on in the monthly *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, published in Chicago. Leading scientists from this country as well as in America have taken part. The discussion was initiated by an article by Cuthbert Daniel, a consulting statistical engineer, and Arthur M. Squires, a physical chemist, both formerly engaged in armaments research. Their article, which had as its caption the saying of Rabelais, *Science sans conscience n'est que ruine de l'âme*, proposed that scientists and engineers should refuse to participate in research relating to weapons or in the making of them, the precise points at which to make a stand to be determined by discussion among scientists.

The authors believe that the great majority of scientists and engineers dislike being employed on the production of weapons of destruction. They are fundamentally decent people, and would welcome nothing more than an agreement that the whole business should be stopped. But so long as their opposite numbers on the other side are engaged on the job, they do not see what they can do. They are caught in the vice of a hideous situation. Decent men have to prepare murder. Somebody has to break the vicious circle, and since American scientists are free to examine the question and to act, they are responsible persons and must accept responsibility for what they do.

There are two important facts, it is maintained, which define the nature of the problem. The weapons in question are not, in the strict sense, weapons of defence; they are weapons of counter-attack which is a different story. The second is that the weapons cannot be produced except by the organization of a large staff of scientists and technicians.

A single individual or a handful of scientists can do little mischief. The problem arises when a large group is set to work on a particular project with heavy financial backing.

What then do the authors of the article desire should be done? They want, in the first place, an active discussion among scientists of the ethical questions involved. Out of this they hope that there may grow a code of professional ethics, such as already exists, for example, in the medical profession. They would like to see a list of research projects prepared on which no civilized scientist would work. They believe that decisions to embark on large-scale projects of research and manufacture of lethal weapons should not be taken in secret by a few men, but should be arrived at after discussion with other responsible groups in society.

The proposals evoked strong and, to some extent, scornful opposition. It was argued that scientists are in danger of exaggerating their importance in war, and that in any case they ought not to mix themselves up in politics but should leave political matters to the politicians. Other objections were the familiar arguments against pacifism in general.

There was, however, in the discussion a good deal of support for the position of Daniel and Squires. Thus Professor A. D. Ritchie maintained that "to be free, a man must take responsibility for the whole of his actions and the whole of their consequences, so far as foreseeable. If he acts under instructions, he must claim to be fully informed by those who issue the instructions as to what is intended and why. He must also claim the right to consult his scientific colleagues and act in conjunction with them. The second claim is vital, because Governments are more and more becoming the employers; and the individual is helpless against them, even in democratic countries". Another contributor made a strong protest against "the degradation of the position of the scientist as an independent worker and thinker to that of a morally irresponsible stooge in a science factory", and maintained that "the subordination of those who ought to think to those who have administrative power" is ruinous both to the morale of the scientist and to the quality of scientific output.

Dr. H. S. W. Massey of London University, executive vice-president of the atomic scientists of Great Britain, develops the original suggestion on constructive lines. It is very difficult, he points out, for those engaged in a particular undertaking to see its far-reaching consequences. The mechanism, the scientific principles involved, all seem so normal that the scientist or the engineer hardly gives the matter a further thought. The only way in which the conscience of the individual can be aroused to consider the full implications of what he is doing is the formation of a "climate" of opinion, of which he cannot fail to be aware.

If a nation is to act in relation to a particular situation, it must, first, become aware of it, secondly decide on the action required, and then provide for carrying out that action. At present the directing group in a nation very often does not become aware of a situation until it is too late to gain a wider and more balanced opinion. Since only scientists have an understanding of new discoveries which enables them to grasp the possible applications, it is their responsibility to ensure that other members of society are made fully aware of what is involved. A great effort is needed to overcome the difficulties, which experience has shown to be very real, of conveying a properly balanced view of new developments to those who lack a scientific training.

The only way, Dr. Massey continued, in which a reasoned attitude to the social and moral implications of scientific discovery can be reached by scientists is by discussion. When they reach agreement, scientists must bring the matter before other responsible groups in the community. If the scientists fail to agree, the differing views should be submitted to those other groups with an explanation of the reasons for failure to agree. Scientists have no right to come to decisions on social and moral questions independently of other members of the community, but they have a moral responsibility to satisfy themselves that the work on which they are engaged is in the best interests of mankind. All this is anything but easy, but Dr. Massey is convinced that much more can be done than is being done at present.



In a concluding article Daniel and Squires reply to the discussion. They suggest that there has been a good deal of side-tracking of the issues. The primary question they wanted to raise is *how* a host of decisions which control the day to day development of science are in fact taken. *Men*, not science, determine the lines along which science evolves. The atom bomb was not "discovered". A small group of men determined to invest a specified number of billions of dollars in the hope of producing it. Other developments in science and technology go by default, because particular groups of men decide deliberately or through apathy that they are not worth pursuing. In actual fact the criteria by which at the present time decisions are generally reached in regard to technical developments are—"Will it make money?" or "Will it kill and destroy more efficiently?" The crucial decisions are taken as a rule by a small group of men. They ought to be taken after full discussion in which all competent opinion has a chance of expressing itself. Daniel and Squires, therefore, reaffirm their original thesis. Some one has to break the vicious circle and even a small group of men in key positions could give a lead.

#### THE SUPPLEMENT

We publish in this number the first of four Supplements by Professor H. Butterfield, Regius Professor of History in the University of Cambridge. The general title of the four is *The Christian and History*, and the remaining three will be on *The Christian and Biblical History*, *The Christian and Marxist History* and *The Christian and the History of the Church*.

Professor Butterfield has for many years devoted thought to this matter of the Christian and history and recently delivered a series of lectures on the subject to crowded audiences in Cambridge. These lectures will be repeated in a series of Third Programme broadcasts in April and May. In these Supplements Professor Butterfield develops his thought in a somewhat different way.

Kathleen Bliss

# THE CHRISTIAN AND HISTORY

## I. The Christian and Academic History

By H. BUTTERFIELD

### THE CASE AGAINST ACADEMIC HISTORY

It has often been argued in recent years that the modern study of academic history—and particularly the modern way of teaching the subject to undergraduates in universities—is unsatisfactory, because it provides no interpretation of the whole drama of human life in time, no explanation of the place of man on the earth, no philosophy or religion that will be of use in the world of actual experience. It has further been objected that if the student seeks, in the approved historical manner, to enter sympathetically into the mind of the twelfth century as well as the nineteenth, or into the outlook of Christian and Moham-medan, Protestant and Catholic, Whig and Tory alike, then he finds himself trapped into a kind of relativism, and he will not extract from historical study as such the kind of values which an educational system should induce him to acquire. There has occasionally been observable amongst Christians almost an envy of Marxist history—almost a desire for a kind of history which can be studied to some purpose, and which will itself give a man a purchase on events, a kind of history not controlled by a superstitious adherence to the idea of the past-as-it-actually-was, but governed rather by what one has determined to do with the future. Some religious thinkers appear to have gone further still, claiming that, since the Christian view of history culminates in the Cross and Resurrection, there is no purpose in studying the course of secular history, especially as it has added nothing to the real meaning of things in the last nineteen hundred years.

Here are four important objections which have their greatest force in respect of the teaching of history to the young, but which are often extended in fact to make a case against historical scholarship as such. They are arguments sometimes adduced against that kind of “academic” history which (instead of offering a total interpretation of human life and vicissitudes under the sun) merely seeks to lay out the story in its concreteness



and its detail, and in fact only provides a limited realm of explanation, the evidence and the apparatus of the historian not qualifying him to claim a higher authority or function than this.

We may remove some obstructions, calculated to hinder or distract the discussion of the essential issue, if we admit that, granted the case for historical scholarship in general, there may be objections (serious for the non-Christian as well as for the Christian very often) to the curriculum and the mode of teaching which are generally in vogue in schools and universities. Further than this, many of us might agree that there is a Biblical interpretation of history which offers to the Christian the only satisfactory way of regarding the drama of the centuries, and discovering the attitude and role that human beings ought to adopt in relation to this. It is possibly true that the customary way of envisaging this human drama, the prevalent attitude to the whole course of history, is in these days an even more serious obstruction to the acceptance of Christianity than the current notions concerning the natural sciences. In any case if men have found no philosophy or religion in their actual experience of life it can hardly be claimed that the "academic" study of history will itself provide the remedy, or that the attempt to learn more scientifically when things happened and how they happened can solve the whole problem of human destiny or achieve anything more than a better statement of the essential riddle. When we have reconstructed mundane history it does not form a self-explanatory system, and our attitude to it, our whole relationship to the human drama, is a matter not of scholarship but of religion—it depends on the way in which we decide to set our personalities for the purpose of meeting the whole stream of events.

#### **THE RELATION BETWEEN HISTORICAL ENQUIRY AND THE INTERPRETATION OF LIFE IN MODERN SOCIETY**

For the assured Christian these problems—these objections to "academic" history—can hardly be said to exist; for, having in his religion the key to his conception of the whole human drama, he can safely embark on a detailed study of mundane events, if only as an examination of the ways of Providence. If "academic" history cannot provide a man with the ultimate valuations and interpretations of life under the sun, neither is it generally competent to take them away from the person who

actually possesses them; and if there is internal friction and tension when the religious man puts on the historian's thinking-cap, the strain is just as constant between religion and one's actual experience of life—in both cases we might say that, for the Christian, the friction which is produced is of a generative kind. Certainly "academic" history is not meant for all people (and is a somewhat technical affair), for it is not the queen of the sciences, and it is not to be regarded as a substitute for religion or a complete education in itself. Those who promoted its study in former times seemed to value it rather as an additional equipment for people who were presumed to have had their real education elsewhere, their real training in values and in the meaning of life in other fields. Those who complain that it does not provide people with the meaning of life are asking from an academic science more than it can give and are tempting the historian himself to a dangerous form of self-aggrandisement. They have caught heresy from the secular liberals who, having deposed religion, set up scholarship in its place and unduly exalted it, assuming that the historian in particular was fitted to give to his readers an interpretation of life on the earth. "Academic" history would be subject to fewer attacks if our educational system as a whole had not gone adrift, and we had not thrown overboard the very things which are a training in values. In any case, for the Christian, religion comes logically the first, and the study of human vicissitude or of the operations of nature is to be regarded as an additional piece of training.

Yet, if our educationists had been wiser it is not at all clear that Christianity would have been the gainer, or that in the middle of the twentieth century the training for life, the training in values (supposing it to have been efficiently organized) would have been a specifically Christian one. It must be remembered in any case that the real cause of most of the difficulties that trouble the critics of historical scholarship lies in the fact that Christianity no longer reigns or presides over the whole range of our society and civilization. The real problem—and perhaps we are all too slow in adjusting our minds to it—is the initial problem of Christianity in a pagan background, a Christianity which is foolishness to the Greeks, and which can hardly claim from Providence (as though it were a matter of right) that the general

influences in the world should not be inimical to it, or that the task of believers should so to speak be made easy for them. It is of course very nice for Churches to have a kind of world in which all the currents of thought are directed by ecclesiastical authority, and all men are brought up so locked in the Christian religion that they are hardly allowed to know that any alternative view of life is even available. It is a question whether such a world could ever be produced, however, save in an intermediate stage in the history of civilization, and after a cruel exercise of force ; and it is questionable whether men in the long run would tolerate it, in view of the abuses to which it is liable and the methods to which it is bound to be committed.

In fact what we are faced with in the twentieth century are the disciples of Marx on the one hand, H. G. Wells (shall we say) on the other, the Protestants and the Jesuits, the Fascists and the Liberals, all producing their selections from the complexity of historical facts and their different organizations of the whole narrative of the centuries—all feeling that theirs is the absolute explanation, and longing to see it established as the basis for a universal teaching and examining system. In a cut-throat conflict between these and other systems for the control of schools and universities (in other words for predominance in society) it is not clear that a specifically Christian or Biblical interpretation would in fact prevail at the present day ; and though it is a sad thing when any man rejects Christianity, still Christians can hardly have a technical ground of complaint in modern society if universities do not pour all their academic teaching into a specifically Christian mould as in former times. Considering their own record of intolerance and persecution where they had the power, Churches must consider it rather fortunate for them that so often their enemies have been less thorough-going—thankful that, if society is not Christian, it is at any rate not yet wholeheartedly anything else. While we have Marxists and Wellsians, Protestants and Catholics, Whigs and Tories, with their mutually exclusive systems (historical assertion confronted by counter-assertion), many people, confounded by the contradictions, will turn thankfully in the last resort to the humbler “academic” historian—to the man who will just try to show what the evidence warrants, and will respect the intricacy and the com-



plexity of events. In the clash of interpretations somebody will sigh in the long run for an answer to the more pedestrian question, the purely historical question: What is the evidence, and what are at any rate the tangible things which demonstrably took place? Men are slow to count their blessings but Christians might even be thankful for this "academic" history at the last stage of the argument—thankful so long as no authoritative interpretation of history and the human drama has been rigorously imposed upon our educational system by an increasingly non-Christian society.

It is true that history—in the academic form that we are discussing—is in a sense very much the study of man. It might be argued—it has indeed been argued—therefore, that any prolonged concern with it must produce or signify a certain "worldly-mindedness", a charge which is no doubt liable to be true in the case of those people who have left their minds unguarded. Those who have used this argument, however, would seem to have forgotten that almost everything else in the world tends to have the same effect, and that most of the human race has to occupy much of its time with very mundane things (especially with human beings) so that the "world" would still have much the same dangers for religion even though we eliminated entirely the pursuit of historical study.

If all this is true then many of the arguments against what is sometimes called the "neutral" character of "academic" history are (in view of the prevailing tendencies to-day) only likely to play into the hands of those Marxist systems which in so many respects embarrass us by their mimicry of the aims and methods of the bygone ecclesiastical order. But more than this, if we consider the shape which the modern world is taking, we might well ask whether it may not turn out that in the long run our "academic" history is more Christian than men have realized.

### **CHRISTIANITY AND "SCIENTIFIC" TRUTH**

In the first place it has sometimes been argued that modern science itself took its rise in western Europe (rather than in some other portion of the globe) precisely because of the sway of Christianity in this region. It would require an intimate knowledge of the history of remote parts of the globe and other civilizations than ours to confirm this speculation—a point which

ought to soften the attitude of those Christians who disparage historical enquiry, since this is one of the cases where the truths that are reached by such enquiry, though they are limited truths, are clearly relevant to the sort of reasoning that Christians sometimes use. In any event (and considering the advances made in the Mohammedan world in the middle ages) the point was better stated perhaps by Duhem, who thought that it was rather the influence of monotheism which led men in general to the view that the universe is regulated by universal laws. The modern world may even now discover that the religious factor has a place in the history of science, and we may learn that the notion of absolute Truth is not unconnected with religion—the Truth being in point of fact something which you cannot cheat God about. In the case of the early seventeenth century attempts to prove the universe to be a watertight mechanism (Kepler for example), one discovers that religion itself was an original impulse to the endeavour—it was felt that God would be erratic and Creation incomplete if there was a gap or loophole in the mechanistic system. And once in the middle ages, when the Aristotelian philosophy forbade men to think that even God could create a vacuum or an infinite universe, a religious edict (refusing to allow that God should be so disparaged, or that mere human reason should exclude the possibility of certain exercises of divine power) provided a freedom for science which had palpable effects on the history of thought. One is tempted to suggest that there has been perceptible in Marxist propaganda a view of historical (and even scientific) truth which, if it were developed over a long period, might have a very unfortunate effect upon the pursuit of knowledge and the very conception of scholarship. It is difficult to be sure what safeguard there would be against such a “utilitarian” handling of Truth if the world were to go on becoming increasingly pagan and increasingly materialistic in its preoccupations and ends. For this reason is it not unthinkable that in the future Christians should come to find themselves after all the defenders *contra mundum* of a view of Truth to which their idea of God is not irrelevant. They may find that it is they who after all must stand as the defenders of that whole intellectual universe in which the academic historian’s search for truth had meaning and could be

pursued with the required austerity. The ideals of "academic" history may transpire to have been the legacy of a Christian civilization after all.

We might have to confess that some Marxists in the present have been better and some Christians in the past much worse than the above argument might seem to suggest, so that such an argument is somewhat speculative and no doubt open to challenge. We are on firmer ground in another field, however, where we may think of history as an extension of our personal experience, a relationship with a wider range of human beings, a bond between us and all the generations that lived before us. Here a point arises which is a technical one for the historical student but which touches on Christian maxims concerning our way of living in the world. There may be some justice in the claim that history is a "science", but if so it is a science dominated by the fact that its particular kind of truth can only be attained by imaginative self-giving in human sympathy.

#### **WHY HISTORY IS NOT "NEUTRAL"**

In a pagan world it is possible that vast hordes of men—great nations—each utterly sincere in its blind self-righteousness, may hate and fight, not even knowing what sympathy and charity are able to do in the way of creating bridges between people who are not like-minded. Similarly it has always been possible to have a successful religion or a successful régime which in the same blindness of self-righteous pride would build its whole version of history on hatred—on the sheer denunciation of its predecessors. In this latter case a mitigation will come especially when there has been a lapse of time, but it comes because more charitable souls have a desire to understand even the despised and defeated, even the people towards whom they were not initially disposed. And historical understanding depends upon this compassion, this urge to see even the outcasts as human beings who could fall in love or be hurt—as people who "if you prick them they will bleed". If some objector thinks that all was very well in the first instance or that, with a wilfully Protestant view of the Reformation and a wilfully Catholic view, all that is necessary is to add the two together or take the average, such a person is even technically wrong in his idea of the nature of history; for the man who has wider charity and imaginative



sympathy, and seeks from a higher altitude to embrace both parties in his comprehension, not only shows greater compassion but uncovers a further range of truths about the Reformation itself. Even of the worst of men, even of Hitler, the historian will want to know how a lump of human nature—or rather a schoolboy playing in a field—could ever have come to be like that. History, as it rises above mere militant partisanship—always committed in a world like ours to loving sinners in spite of the sin—knits the broken threads of time together again, and, brooding more in sorrow than in anger over the conflicts that have so often torn the human race, brings to them human understanding and a reconciling mind. In a world that is fast losing these arts that might have saved it, the practice of this kind of historical study is a useful training for the actual conduct of life; and to Christians who believe that the world needs charity such exercises reveal new paths for the sympathetic imagination—expose the ways in which we have been too narrowly uncomprehending in the past. Such history is not “neutral” save in the sense that it seeks to extend its charity to all men, and if some history lacks the warmth and sympathy of this ideal we must not condemn academic history as such but merely recall it to its own essential principles.

## **HISTORY AND PERSONALITY**

All this implies a high estimation of human personality regarded as (from a mundane point of view) an end in itself. Such valuation may owe less to Christianity—less even to Greece and Rome—than some people assert, for in some of the aspects of it which the world most prizes it has seemed to come with an advanced and highly differentiated civilization, even while the power of religion in society was declining. In the long run it is always of great significance, however, that Christianity sees human beings as souls meant for eternity, unlike anything else in creation; and it is possible that the greatest of future conflicts between Christian and pagan (or at least the greatest of those which have relation to mundane affairs) will concern the question whether the individual personality is regarded as an absolute or man is envisaged as merely part of nature, part of the animal kingdom. Now the thing which we have come to regard as history would disappear if students of the past ceased to regard

the world of men as a thing apart—ceased to envisage a world of human relations set up against nature and the animal kingdom. It has been said that if a lamb should die in May, before it had reproduced itself, or contributed to the development of the species, or provided a fleece for the market, still the fact that it frisked and frolicked in the spring was in one sense an end in itself, and in another sense a thing that tended to the glory of God. This view would serve to typify the attitude of the historian, as distinct from that of the biologist, only interested in such history as relates to the development of the species as a whole. Because in man the spiritual and the temporal intersect, every moment, every individual, matters, every human soul is worth befriending, and those who laugh at a research-student for burying himself in a period of the Icelandic past are overlooking the fact that human life always has its interest—they are somewhat like the people who laugh at the idea of a God who notices the fall of a sparrow. Furthermore, to the historian every event, every action, is to be studied not as an external thing, not as a mere part in some system of mechanics, but as a thing incomprehensible save as it goes into or comes out of human minds; so that de-personalized studies, mere schematizations—pure diagrams of social interaction and sociological development—contravene the real nature of history precisely at the point at which they offend the Christian view of life.

If the academic historian lays out the story of the centuries—a story which in a certain sense is the extension over long period of what we see of life in the few decades of our actual experience—the question next arises: What happens to this story, this panorama of world-history when one believes in Biblical interpretations and in the Christian view of the whole drama of human life in time?

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